HOW AND WHY THE SUPREME COURT BREATHED LIFE TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 15(4) AND 17(2) OF THE ACJA, 2015 IN FRN V AKAEZE (2024) LPELR-62190(SC)

Abstract

Prior to the latest 2024 judgment of the Supreme Court in FRN v Akaeze, the position of the law based on the judgment of the same Supreme Court was that the provisions of section 15(4) and 17(2) of the ACJA, 2015 on the procedure for obtaining confessional statement were not mandatory. The Supreme Court had interpreted that the word “May'” in those provisions cannot be interpreted as compulsory. This worked a lot of mischief on defendants as it also defeated the purpose of the ACJA. In an obvious shift in position, the Supreme Court, in its latest judgment in FRN v Akaeze applied the mischief rule to hold that the provisions of section 15(4) and 17(2) are mandatory. Against this backdrop, the paper adopted the doctrinal research method and critically examined relevant statutory provisions on confessional statement as well as previous and current judgments of the apex Supreme Court on the vexed subject matter in order to explicate the reasons why the paradigm shift in the law was recorded and why it remained preferable. As it is hornbook law that where there are two or more conflicting judgments, it is the latest in time that constitutes res judicata, it was recommended among other things that the progressive position of the law recorded in the latest judgment in FRN v Akaeze should be rigidly maintained and followed. Any confessional statement obtained in violation of the minimum procedural standard erected under the ACJA should remain involuntary inadmissible and rejected.