BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

Abstract

This article undertakes a critical philosophical examination of the interrelated concepts of belief, knowledge, and reality within the framework of epistemology and metaphysics. It begins by situating the discussion within classical and contemporary theories of knowledge, highlighting epistemology’s concern with the justification, scope, and certainty of human knowledge claims. The primary objective of the study is to clarify the conceptual distinctions and connections between belief and knowledge, and to explore how these are grounded in differing conceptions of reality. Methodologically, the article adopts a conceptual–analytical approach, engaging key philosophical positions from both classical and modern thinkers, including Aristotelian realism, empiricism, process philosophy, and contemporary epistemological accounts of justified true belief. The analysis reveals that while belief is a necessary component of knowledge, it is not sufficient without truth and justification, and that many epistemic errors arise from the conflation of belief with knowledge. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that conceptions of reality, whether substance-based or process-oriented profoundly shape epistemological commitments and standards of justification. It also shows that cultural and contextual factors influence belief systems, though not all truth claims are reducible to relativism. The article concludes that a critical interrogation of beliefs, grounded in evidential support and a coherent understanding of reality, is essential for distinguishing knowledge from mere opinion. Such philosophical vigilance is necessary not only for theoretical clarity but also for responsible action in practical life.