INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR CLIMATE-CHANGE GOVERNANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT 2015

Abstract

Climate change, the quintessential global commons dilemma, demands an unprecedented level of international cooperation. This study interrogates Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 2015 as a juridical apparatus for enabling transboundary climate governance through market and non-market approaches. The research problem lies in the ambiguity, operational deficits, and equity challenges inherent in the implementation of cooperative mechanisms-specifically, Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs), the Sustainable Development Mechanism, and non-market frameworks. Employing a doctrinal legal methodology, the study critically analyses treaty provisions, COP decisions and comparative legal regimes to distil the normative scope and functional performance of Article 6. The findings reveal that while Article 6 embodies significant promise for enhancing ambition and cost-effectiveness in climate mitigation, its efficacy is impeded by legal uncertainties, governance fragilities, and asymmetries in technological and institutional capacities among parties. The study therefore recommends the urgent operationalisation of a robust Article 6 rulebook with precise accounting standards, enhanced transparency frameworks, and equitable benefit-sharing models. It further advocates for increased climate finance, technology transfer, and South-South cooperation to facilitate the participation of developing countries in emerging carbon markets. In conclusion, the study affirms that the success of Article 6 is not merely contingent on legal sophistication but on political will, institutional coherence, and global solidarity. If well harnessed, Article 6 could become the linchpin of climate multilateralism-transforming ambition into action and fostering a just transition to a low-carbon global economy.