

TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

Terrorism has significantly undermined Nigeria's security and economic stability, with groups like Boko Haram (BH), Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) perpetuating violence across the country. Nigeria remains one of the most terror-affected nations globally, leading to several deaths and huge economic loss. This article explores the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria, including poverty, corruption, weak institutions, and ineffective intelligence gathering. It also examines the economic consequences, such as declining Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), displacement of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), loss of tourism revenue, and increased government expenditure on security. Additionally, this work highlights the link between terrorism and human rights violations, forced migration, and human trafficking. It is the observation of this work that the fight against terrorism in Nigeria remains ineffective due to weak political will. This article recommends the urgent need for comprehensive reforms to address the structural issues fueling insecurity in the country. Doctrinal method of research was employed in this article.

KEY WORDS: Terrorism, Fight, human rights violations, Corruption, Economic Impact

1.1. Introduction

The activities of terrorist groups like *Boko Haram (BH) and Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan* and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) have not only been an embarrassment to Nigeria but have impacted negatively on the Nigerian economy. Recently, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) rated Nigeria the 3rd most terrorized country in the world, a position it has maintained since 2015, after Afghanistan and Iraq.¹ The number of deaths attributed to BH increased by 25% from 2018 to 2019 and the group is said to be an active threat to the whole West Africa.² In fact since 2001, 22,441 persons have died as a result of terrorist attacks in Nigeria, while more than 2,000,000 people have been displaced and 240,000 Nigerian refugees

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¹ The Institute of Economics and Peace, 'Global Terrorism Index 2020', *The Institute of Economics and Peace, 2020*, 1-105, at 8, available at <<https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf>>, accessed on 27th November 2020.

² *ibid*, at 13.

flee to neighboring countries.³ A conservative economic estimate of the impact of terrorism in Nigeria from 2007 to 2019 is \$142billion.⁴ All these go to show the extent to which terrorism is ravaging the Nigerian economy.

Thus, this article explores the challenges and prospects of terrorism in Nigeria. To this extent, issues like poverty, easy flow of cash, insufficient regional and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, weak institutions, corruption, ineffective intelligence and counter intelligence gathering, ethnicity and religion, social disenfranchisement and exclusion shall be explored. The impact of terrorism on the Nigerian economy will also be explored under this article. The proper examination of these issues in this article will illuminate the possibility of future success in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.

1.2. Challenges to the Fight against Terrorism in Nigeria.

1.2.1. Ineffective Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Gathering.

A report by the United States Bureau for counter-terrorism found that *ISWA* is trying to “cultivate stronger ties with local communities”.⁵ Evidence shows that BH and *ISWA* are in control of most of Borno and Yobe States as they freely move around and engage in other activities without any hindrance.⁶ The strategy adopted by BH is territorial conquest, establishment of full administrative post in the areas they occupy, use of the internet to disseminate propaganda, ambushes and kidnappings and attacks on the army and other security agencies.⁷ BH is also involved in arms acquisition, recruitment, training and financing, which cut across the Nigeria border.⁸ Goodluck Jonathan, a former President of Nigeria is of the view that BH is worse than the Nigerian Civil War since under the Civil War, the people fighting were

³ *ibid*, at 21.

⁴ *ibid*, at 35.

⁵ Bureau of Counterterrorism, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Nigeria’, U.S. Department of State, 2019, available at <<https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/nigeria/>>, accessed on 4th December 2020.

⁶ *Ibid*.

⁷ Eme Okechukwu Innocent, ‘Inter-Security Agency Rivalry as an Impediment to National Counter Terrorism Strategy’, *AfriHeritage Research Working Paper*, 2018-003, 1-24, at 7 & 8, available at <<https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Inter-Security-Agency-Rivalry.pdf>>, accessed on 6th December 2020.

⁸ *Ibid*, at 8.

known, while the activities of BH are not really predictable.⁹ All these indicate the dynamism in the fight against terrorism and the need for the military and other security agencies to be proactive. However, poor intelligence gathering and rivalry among security agencies have been identified as some of the factors militating against the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.¹⁰ It is worth knowing that the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigeria Police, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC), Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Service and the Nigeria Army are all active in the fight against terrorism under the umbrella of the Joint Task Force (JTF), but there is lack of coordination among them.¹¹ In response to the increase in the tempo of terrorist attacks, the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) was set up in 2014.¹² The aim of NACTEST is to “forestall threats, secure territories, identify, prepare and implement policy directives”.¹³ It is observed that instead of being an asset, the security agencies have become liabilities as they are engrossed in supremacy rivalry which has made it difficult to realize the objectives of NACTEST.¹⁴

It is argued that “civil society groups, academia, communities, faith-based organizations, households” play active role in the fight against terrorism as they assist in intelligence gathering and analysis.¹⁵ In other words, to curtail the activities of terrorists, the wider stake needs to play active role. The need for the wider stake to participate in the fight against terrorism is because terrorists are members of the local communities and are known by the locals. However, the relationship between Nigeria security agencies and communities is nothing to write home about. According to Amnesty International, security forces withdrew from Rann shortly before armed group attacked the community and killed sixty people and displaced more than nine thousand

⁹ Osuma Oarhe, ‘The Responses of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments to the Boko Haram Security Challenge’, *E-International Relations*, November 6, 2013, available at <<https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/06/the-responses-of-the-nigerian-defense-and-intelligence-establishments-to-the-boko-haram-security-challenge/>>, accessed on 9th December 2020.

¹⁰ Maurice Ogbonnaya, ‘Rooting out Corruption in the Security Sector will help the Country address its growing Terror threat’, *Institute for Security Studies*, 4th February, 2020, available at <<https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-counter-terrorism-become-a-profitable-business-in-nigeria>>, accessed on 4th November 2020.

¹¹ Bureau of Counterterrorism, *supra*.

¹² Eme Okechukwu Innocent, *supra*.

¹³ *ibid*.

¹⁴ *ibid*, at 3.

¹⁵ Innocent Chukwuma, ‘Responding to the Emerging Trends of Terrorism in Nigeria’, *Cleen Foundation Justice Sector Reform, Monograph Series* [2011] No. 16, 1-98, at 3, available at <<https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Responding-to-the-Emerging-Trends-of-Terrorism-in-Nigeria.pdf>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

people.¹⁶ The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports that Nigeria security forces have killed more Nigerians than Covid-19 and they also have reputation for brutality.¹⁷ For instance, between 1999 and 2015, the Nigeria Military killed seven thousand and fifty civilians and another ten thousand seven hundred and seventy four people from 2015 to date.¹⁸ The security forces have been accused of being involved in extortion, mass murder, human rights violations, burning of houses, *et cetera*.¹⁹ The action of security forces in this instance seems to create the impression that they have aligned with terrorist groups against the masses thus, making Nigerians to lose confidence in them.

Nigeria is located in Western Africa and has a land mass of 923,769 square kilometers.²⁰ However, there are no Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in any street in Nigeria.²¹ The only State that has something close to CCTV is Lagos which deployed mobile surveillance on its streets.²² The role of CCTV on surveillance, intelligence gathering and reconnaissance cannot be overemphasized.²³ The fact that there are no CCTVs and other visual recognition devices on the streets of Nigeria is a blow in its fight against terrorism. Little wonder Abubakar Shekau, factional leader of BH post videos of his activities regularly on the internet without any fear of being caught. Also, the fact that Internet is used for terrorist purposes²⁴ highlight the need for

¹⁶ Amnesty International, 'Nigeria 2019', Amnesty International, 2019, available at <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/nigeria/report-nigeria/>>, accessed on 8th November 2020.

¹⁷ British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Coronavirus: Security Forces Kill more Nigerians than Covid-19', *British Broadcasting Corporation*, April 16, 2020, available at <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52317196>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

¹⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, 'Sub-Saharan Security Tracker', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 2020, available at <<https://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/sub-saharan-security-tracker/p37884>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

¹⁹ Osumara Oarhe, 'The Responses of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments to the Boko Haram Security Challenge', *E-International Relations*, November 6, 2013, available at <<https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/06/the-responses-of-the-nigerian-defense-and-intelligence-establishments-to-the-boko-haram-security-challenge/>>., accessed on 9th November 2020.

²⁰ Nations Encyclopedia, 'Nigeria', Encyclopedia of Nations, 2020, available at <<https://www.Nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

²¹ Omolara Oseni, 'Nigerian House of Reps to consider a Bill to mandate the installation of CCTV Cameras Nationwide', *Techpoint Africa*, January 8, 2020, available at <<https://techpoint.africa/2020/01/08/cctv-cameras-in-nigeria/>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

²² *ibid*.

²³ IFSEC, 'CCTV and its role in the Counter-Terror Agenda', *IFSEC Global*, August 4, 2011, available at <<https://www.ifsecglobal.com/video-surveillance/cctv-and-its-role-in-the-counter-terror-agenda/>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

²⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 'The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes', United Nations, 2012, 1-142, at 3, available at <https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf>, accessed on 9th December 2020.

Internet providers in Nigeria to be proactive. According to the United Nations (UN), Internet is used by terrorists for:

*propaganda, (including recruitment, radicalization and incitement to terrorism); financing; training; planning (including through secret communication and open-source information); execution; and cyber attacks.*²⁵

The fact that terrorist groups in Nigeria rely on the Internet to showcase their activities without any trace demonstrates that much still needs to be done in intelligence and counterintelligence gathering in Nigeria.

1.2.2. Ineffective Regional and International Cooperation in the fight against Terrorism.

The activities of BH cut across the Nigerian border and it has links with *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghred, *Al Shabaab*, and has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and renamed itself ISWAP.²⁶ This led the armies of Chad, Cameroun and Niger to team up with Nigeria in the fight against terrorism.²⁷ The need for regional and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism is to prevent easy flows of arms and fighters and prevent the terrorists in Nigeria from getting support from *Al-Qaeda*, ISIS and other foreign terrorist groups. It is worth knowing that as recent as the year 2020, the United States of America (USA) warned Nigeria that *Al-Qaeda* and ISIS are trying to infiltrate the country and other Africa regions.²⁸ The UN in response to terrorism has focused mainly on international cooperation on the investigation, extradition and prosecution of terrorists.²⁹ The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 8, 2006 adopted Resolution 60/288 and an annexed Plan of Action.³⁰ The aim of the Action plan is to condemn and fight all forms of terrorism and crimes that might be connected

²⁵ *ibid.*

²⁶ Eme Okechukwu Innocent, *supra.*

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ Agency Report, 'Al-Qaeda, ISIS Infiltration: Nigeria not taking U.S. Warning Lightly - DHQ', *Premium Times*, August 13, 2020, available at <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/more-news/408719-al-qaeda-isis-infiltration-nigeria-not-taking-u-s-warning-lightly-dhq.html>>, accessed on 8th December 2020.

²⁹ United Nations, 'Strengthening International Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Promoting the Implementation of the Universal Conventions and Protocols related to Terrorism within the Framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime', *United Nations*, July 25, 2006, 1-18, at 3, available at <<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/453781070.pdf>>, accessed on 11th December 2020.

³⁰ Dana Perkins, 'The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the Role of the Security Council in WMD Non-Proliferation', Arms Control Seminar: Arms Control Seminar: Verification and Transparency Challenges in Biological Arms Control and Nonproliferation, February 6, 2013, available at <<https://www.un.org/ar/sc/1540/documents/expert-presentation-2013-6-Richland.pdf>>, accessed on 12th December 2020.

with terrorism. The Action Plan also mandates members States to comply with all UNGA resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism. The UN approach has moved away from hard military response to terrorism to “a more nuanced approach that combines concerns over security with the pursuit of development and the promotion of human rights”.³¹ The approach of the UN recognizes that there are societal and economic problems like poverty, illiteracy, *et cetera* that need to be addressed to make the fight against terrorism a complete success.

At the African level, the first step taken in the fight against terrorism is the adoption of Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States (AHG/Res.213 XXVIII) where African countries pledged to fight all forms of terrorism and the Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-Africa Relations (AHG/Del.2 XXX) where the Organization of African States (OAU) rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism and made all terrorists acts a criminal offence.³² Member States of the OAU signed the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the African Union (AU) Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa in 1999 and 2002 respectively. These Conventions compel member States to promulgate local laws criminalizing all forms of terrorist acts. The Conventions also created the legal framework for extradition, extra-territorial investigation and mutual legal assistance.

On the 16th of January, 2008, member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) MSC/REG. 1/01/08 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The aim of this Framework is to maintain peace, security and stability in the ECOWAS region. This was followed by an Action Plan on the ECPF launched in Abuja, Nigeria on January 24, 2019.³³ It is worth knowing that this Action Plan is targeted at:

³¹ Ernest Harsch, ‘Africa Looks beyond ‘War on Terror’’, United Nations Africa Renewal, 2009, available at <<https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2009/africa-looks-beyond-%E2%80%98war-terror%E2%80%99>>, accessed on 13th December 2020.

³² UNODC, ‘The African Region’, 2018, available at <<https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/african-region.html>>, accessed on 12th December 2020.

³³ Economic Community of West African States, ‘ECOWAS Launches Plans of Action for its Conflict Prevention Framework’, 2019, available at <<https://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-launches-plans-of-action-for-its-conflict-prevention-framework/>>, accessed on 12th December 2020.

*Early warning, preventive diplomacy, democracy and political governance, human rights and rule of law, media, natural resource governance, cross-border initiatives and security governance, women, peace and security, youth empowerment, ECOWAS Stand-by Force, Humanitarian assistance,*³⁴

By this framework and the accompanying Action Plan, ECOWAS member States recognize the threat posed by terrorists, the negative impacts it has on the economy and the need to take proactive steps to identify and neutralize terrorists' threats.

In response to the threat posed by terrorists, Nigeria came together with Cameroun, Chad, Niger and Benin under the Lake Chad Basin Commission to form a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF).³⁵ However, the fact that the GTI rated Nigeria the most terrorized country in the world means that regional and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria have not been effective. Thus, there is need to reassess the approaches adopted in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. The next subsection examines the extent to which corruption is a challenge to the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.

1.2.3. Corruption.

Corruption has been identified as one of the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria.³⁶ From 2010 to 2017, Nigerian government allocated ₦6.7 trillion to the security sector, borrowed USD1 billion in 2013 to fund counter terrorism and USD21 million in 2015 for MJTF.³⁷ Despite the huge sums of money allocated for security, attacks by BH and other terrorist groups have become a reoccurring issue. The success and boldness of BH and other terrorist groups in attacking the military and other security agencies may be an indication that the money allocated for security is not channeled to the right direction. For instance, in 2015, the Office of the National Security Adviser and the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff were accused of diverting USD2.1 billion

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ United Nations, 'Cooperation, Colaboration between Countries Crucial in Combating International Terrorism, Sixth Committee Speakers stress, Hailing 'Code of Conduct'', United Nations, October 4, 2018, available at <<https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gal3567.doc.htm>>, accessed on 11th December 2020.

³⁶ European Parliament, 'Nigeria: MEPs call for International Cooperation to stop Boko Haram', European Parliament News, April 30, 2015, available at <<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20150424I-PR45742/nigeria-meps-call-for-international-cooperation-to-stop-boko-haram>>, accessed on 10th December 2020.

³⁷ Maurice Ogbonnaya, 'Has Counter-Terrorism become a profitable business in Nigeria', Institute for Security Studies, 2020, available at <<https://issafrica.org/iss-today/has-counter-terrorism-become-a-profitable-business-in-nigeria>>, accessed on 14th December 2020.

and ₦3.9 billion respectively meant for arms procurement, in 2017, USD43 million meant for covert operation by the National Intelligence Agency was found in a private building in Lagos and in 2018, USD1 billion meant for arms procurement by the Nigerian Military went missing.³⁸

It is also argued that

*conflict entrepreneurs within the hierarchy of military leadership and ministries, departments and agencies in the security sector apparently use military funds meant for counter-terrorism operations to enrich themselves.*³⁹

It is worth knowing that despite military budget in 2015 of about USD6 billion, BH still outguns the Nigerian Military in battle grounds.⁴⁰

Also, the wages of the ‘rank and file’ in the Nigerian military is nothing to write home about. As at 2015, the monthly salary of soldiers fighting BH is USD100 and they stay for weeks after the end of every month without receiving their salaries.⁴¹ There is evidence that military commanders inflate the number of soldiers under their command in order to take ‘ghost’ salaries.⁴² Thus, the high rate of corruption in the Nigerian military has impacted negatively on the Nigerian security agencies. For instance on September 2020, ISWAP attacked a security convoy in Baga, Borno State killing more than thirty security officers.⁴³ In April, 2015, twenty-six troops were killed and eighty-three injured in an ambush,⁴⁴ while in September 20, 2020, a Colonel was fatally wounded and three of his soldiers killed by BH in Damboa, Borno State.⁴⁵ In

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ *ibid.*

⁴⁰ John Campbell, ‘U.S. Policy to Counter Nigeria’s Boko Haram’, Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, 1-39, at 13, available at <https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/11/Nigeria_CSR70.pdf>, accessed on 14th December 2020.

⁴¹ Kevin Sieff, ‘The Nigerian Military is so Broken, Its Soldiers are refusing to fight’, the Washington Post, May 10, 2015, available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/the-nigerian-military-is-so-broken-its-soldiers-are-refusing-to-fight/2015/05/06/d56fabac-dcae-11e4-b6d7-b9bc8acf16f7_story.html>, accessed on 16/12/2020.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Aljazeera, ‘Several Killed in an Attack on Security Convoy in Northeast Nigeria’, *Aljazeera News*, September 26, 2020, available at <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/26/several-killed-in-attack-on-security-convoy-in-northeast-nigeria>>, accessed on 16th December 2020.

⁴⁴ Kevin Sieff, *supra*.

⁴⁵ Hasan Maina Kaina, ‘Nigerian Military Leader, Fatally Wounded in Boko Haram Ambush, Remembered as Hero’, *Voice of America*, September 24, 2020, available at <<https://www.voanews.com/africa/nigerian-military-leader-fatally-wounded-boko-haram-ambush-remembered-hero>>, accessed on 16th December 2020.

May 2015, the Washington Post reports that the Nigerian military is so broken that soldiers are refusing to fight due to lack of weapons.⁴⁶ In 2019, a major and twenty-one soldiers fled from BH attack in Gubio, Borno State that killed eighteen soldiers.⁴⁷ In 2014, about four hundred soldiers sought refuge in Cameroun after fleeing BH attack.⁴⁸ All these go to show that corruption has weakened the capability of the Nigerian army to fight terrorism, demoralized the Nigerian military and emboldened BH and other terrorist groups. The next subsection examines the role played by cash flow in the fight against terrorism.

4.2.4. Easy Flow of Cash.

There is evidence that BH has infiltrated the Nigerian government and the military.⁴⁹ The Nigerian Army had about four hours notice that terrorists were about to attack Chibok but did nothing to stop it.⁵⁰ BH has become so rich that it not only has some military and government officials under its pay, but has made being its member very attractive to the younger generation due to poverty.⁵¹

As at 2002, the UN recognized the extent to which terrorism could be financed and introduced the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.⁵² The essence of the Convention is to mandate member States to protect their financial system from being used to fund the activities of terrorist or persons planning to engage in terrorism. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) through the Convention assists member States to implement anti-money-laundry measures and also assists in detecting, confiscating and seizing illicit proceeds of crime.⁵³ To facilitate this, the UNODC has established financial intelligence

⁴⁶ Kevin Sieff, *supra*.

⁴⁷ Samuel Ogundipe, 'Nigerian Army declares 22 Soldiers wanted for 'running' from Boko Haram', *Premium Times*, October 3, 2019, available at <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/355713-exclusive-nigerian-army-declares-22-soldiers-wanted-for-running-from-boko-haram-full-list.html>>, accessed on 16th December 2020.

⁴⁸ *ibid*.

⁴⁹ John Campbell, *supra*.

⁵⁰ *ibid*.

⁵¹ Sam Ellis, 'How Islamist Militant Groups are gaining strength in Africa', VOX Media, June 21, 2018, available at <<https://www.vox.com/2018/6/21/17484188/isis-islamist-militant-terrorism-qaeda-africa-boko-haram>>, accessed on 18th December 2020.

⁵² United Nations, 'Strengthening International Cooperation and Technical Assistance in Promoting the Implementation of the Universal Conventions and Protocols related to Terrorism within the Framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime', *supra*, at 10.

⁵³ *ibid*.

units with the mandate to receive, analyze, and disseminate information related to money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.⁵⁴ It is worth examining the avenues BH and ISWAP generate revenue to sustain their operations in Nigeria.

The annual income of BH is estimated to be about USD10 million.⁵⁵ An analysis on the nexus between cattle rustling proceeds and BH insurgency found that proceeds from cattle rustling have been used to fund BH.⁵⁶ BH does this by having middle men who sell the cows in cow markets and transfer the proceeds to the terrorists. Kidnapping is one of the means through which BH generates revenue and it charges as much as €2 million to release its victims.⁵⁷ An arrested BH member confessed that the group uses proceeds of bank robbery to buy arms.⁵⁸ Taxation and extortion have also been identified as some of the avenues BH generate cash to sustain its operations.⁵⁹ The ease with which cash flows to BH and the high rate of corruption in the Nigerian Army as examined above mean that it can easily buy more sophisticated arms and ammunitions than the military. This may also account for why BH and other terrorist groups have remained very active in Nigeria for years.

It is argued that BH uses “fraudulent identities and documentation to open and run bank accounts, as well as paying off bank employees to cover up their activities”.⁶⁰ For instance, the Federal Court of Appeal of the United Arab Emirate convicted six Nigerians for transferring USD 782, 000 from Dubai to BH in Nigeria.⁶¹ This is a serious indictment on the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) since it shows that it has not been living up to expectation. It should be noted

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ Action On Armed Violence, ‘Sources of Funding (including self-funding) for the major groupings that perpetrate IED incidents – Boko Haram’, Action on Armed Violence, May 25, 2017, available at <<https://aoav.org.uk/2017/sources-funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-boko-haram/>>, accessed on 18/12/2020.

⁵⁶ Al Chukwuma Okoli, ‘Cows, Cash and Terror: How Cattle Rustling Proceeds Fuel Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria’, *African Development*, [2019] Vol. XLIV, No. 2, 53-76, at 70, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26873429?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A561ad00c27a495aed6ce79c849a69b05&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents>, accessed on 18th December 2020.

⁵⁷ Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw, ‘Freedom for the World’s most Famous Hostages came at a Heavy Price’, *The Wall Street Journal*, [2017] May 6, available at <<https://www.wsj.com/articles/two-bags-of-cash-for-boko-haram-the-untold-story-of-how-nigeria-freed-its-kidnapped-girls-1513957354>>, accessed on 18/12/2020.

⁵⁸ Afeez Hanafi, ‘We Use Proceeds of Bank Robberies to Buy Explosives – Suspected Boko Haram Commander’, *Punch Newspaper*, January 5, 2019, available at <<https://punchng.com/we-used-proceeds-of-bank-roberies-to-buy-explosives-suspected-boko-haram-commander/>>, accessed on 18/12/2020.

⁵⁹ Action on Armed Violence, *supra*.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ John Campbell, ‘Financing Boko Haram’, *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 18, 2020, available at <<https://www.cfr.org/blog/financing-boko-haram>>, accessed on 18/12/2020.

that an official of the Nigerian government was recently implicated for being a senior undercover agent of BH and facilitates the transfer of fund to the group.⁶² BH is also said to use human cash couriers to transport cash.⁶³ All these show that BH is getting the needed cash to remain active in Nigeria and the security agencies and the financial institutions have failed in checkmating cash flows to BH. As stated above, soldiers fighting BH earn as little as USD 100 which is not paid as and when due. This means that the incentive to accept bribes from BH in exchange for information is high amongst security officials. The next subsection explores the role ethnicity is playing in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.

1.2.5. Ethnicity.

It has been argued that one of the reasons why the fight against terrorism in Nigeria has not been successful is its misclassification as an ideological terror organization, disregarding its ethnicity background and ties.⁶⁴ It is said that ethnicity, religious diversity, discrimination and poverty predominant in Africa make the Continent susceptible to radicalism.⁶⁵ Nigeria is made up of more than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups but the three major ethnic groups are the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa.⁶⁶ There are thirty-six States in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and the States are further grouped into six zones to wit: North Central; North East; North West; South East; South West and South South.⁶⁷ The two major religions are Christianity and Islam – the Christians are predominantly in the Southern States while the Muslims are

⁶² William Uke, 'Six Nigerians Convicted in UAE for Funding Boko Haram in 2019', *NairaMetrics*, November 9, 2020, available at <<https://nairametrics.com/2020/11/09/six-nigerians-convicted-in-uae-for-funding-boko-haram-in-2019/>>, accessed on 18/12/2020.

⁶³ Action on Armed Violence, *supra*.

⁶⁴ Maïke Knoechelmann, 'Why the Nigerian Counter-Terrorism Policy towards Boko Haram has failed: A Cause and Effect Relationship', International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2014, 1-27, at 10, available at <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep09448.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa352a19bb0da92e48c9e92cc1fae270d>>, accessed on 13/12/2020.

⁶⁵ Princeton N. Lyman, 'The War on Terrorism in Africa', Westview Press, Persus Books Group, in John Harbeson, 'Africa in World Politics', 1-28, at 1, available at <https://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/Lyman_chapter_Terrorism.pdf>, accessed on 14th December 2020.

⁶⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, 'The World Factbook', Central Intelligence Agency, 2020, available at <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>>, accessed on 19th December 2020.

⁶⁷ European Asylum Support Office, 'Country Guidance Nigeria', European Asylum Support Office, 2019, available at <https://www.easo.europa.eu/country-guidance-nigeria/general-remarks-1>, accessed on 19th December 2020.

predominantly in the Northern States.⁶⁸ It is worth knowing that BH is active in the North East Nigeria and its members are Muslims.⁶⁹

BH operates on the premise that western education is a sacrilege and aims to promote Islam in the whole Nigeria. For instance, after the recent kidnap of over three hundred boys in a boarding school in Katsina State, BH released a video directing that all schools should be closed except Koranic schools.⁷⁰ It is worth noting that since Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the leadership of the Country has been dominated by Northern Muslims.⁷¹ Under Buhari's administration, almost all the security agencies are headed by Northern Muslims and this has been a source of worry for other regions.⁷² In fact, during the administration of Jonathan, there was an intensified effort to defeat BH but Buhari, the current President in one his campaigns said that attack on BH is attack on the North.⁷³ All these may be the reason why the threat posed by BH is downplayed by the current administration in Nigeria. It is also worth knowing that there have been calls for 'total and unconditional' amnesty to be granted to BH.⁷⁴ Also, captured BH members are rehabilitated and allowed to re-enter the society.⁷⁵ The attitude of the current administration of President Buhari of pampering BH instead of treating them as criminals and

⁶⁸ Ade Ajayi, 'Nigeria', Britannica, October 23, 2020, available at <<https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria>>, accessed on 19th December 2020.

⁶⁹ Saskia Brechenmacher, 'Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria after Boko Haram', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2019, available at <<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042>>, accessed on 19th December 2020.

⁷⁰ British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Nigeria's Katsina School Abduction: Boko Haram shows video 'of seized Boys'', British Broadcasting Corporation, December 18, 2020, available at <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55353358>>, accessed on 20th December 2020.

⁷¹ The Presidency, 'Past Presidents and Heads of State: Chronologies of Past Presidents and Heads of State', *Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation*, 2020, available at <<https://www.osgf.gov.ng/about-us/history/past-presidents-and-heads-state>>, accessed on 20th December 2020.

⁷² Dayo Oketola, Fisayo Falodi and Jesusegun Alagbe, 'Southern Groups Knock Buhari's Pro-North Security Appointments', *Punch Newspaper*, July 2, 2016, available at <<https://punchng.com/southern-groups-knock-buharis-pro-north-security-appointments/>>, accessed on 20th December 2020.

⁷³ Okupe, 'Buhari said attack on Boko Haram is attack on the North', *Channels Television*, December 15, 2014, available at <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vq0MFpRmrYU>>, accessed on 20/12/2020 and Alex Thurston, 'Nigeria: A Statement by General Buhari on Boko Haram, and its Aftermath', Sahel Blog, May 29, 2012, available at <<https://sahelblog.wordpress.com/2012/05/29/nigeria-a-statement-by-general-buhari-on-boko-haram-and-its-aftermath/>>, accessed on 20th December 2020.

⁷⁴ Michael Nwankpa, 'The Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis of the Boko Haram and Niger Delta Insurgencies', *Journal of Terrorism Research* [2014] Vol.5, Iss.1, 67-77, at 73, available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280944603_The_Politics_of_Amnesty_in_Nigeria_A_Comparative_Analysis_of_the_Boko_Haram_and_Niger_Delta_Insurgencies>, accessed on 20th December 2020.

⁷⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation, 'Nigeria Releases Boko Haram Suspects after Rehabilitation', *BBC News Services*, January 16, 2018, available at <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42705381>>, accessed on 20th December 2020.

murderers that they are may be an indication that BH activities have more to do with ethnicity than ideology. The next subsection examines weak institutions as one of the challenges to the fight against terrorism in Nigeria.

1.2.6. Social Disenfranchisement and Exclusion

According to a National Bureau of Statistics Report on poverty and inequality in Nigeria in 2019, 40.1% of Nigerians which translates to about 82.9 million Nigerians were classified as poor.⁷⁶ The Report shows that the poverty rate in the Northern part of Nigeria is almost twice higher than that of other regions.⁷⁷ In 2010 for instance, poverty rate in the North-West was 71.4%, North-East 69.1 and North-Central 60.7%.⁷⁸ As at the second quarter of 2020, unemployment rate in Nigeria was 27.1%, while youth unemployment/underemployment was 34.9%.⁷⁹ Also, a Report on Drug Abuse and Enforcement from 2012-2016 shows that North-West and North-Central recorded the highest number of drug cases.⁸⁰ All these go to show that there are social problems prevalent in the Northern part of Nigeria that makes them vulnerable to the influence of BH and other terrorist groups.

It has been argued that the Nigerian economy is skewed in such a way that it favors the economic and political elites.⁸¹ The end result of this is “erosion of democratic governance, the diminishing social cohesion and the vanishing of equal opportunities for all”.⁸² This assertion is more visible in the Northern part of Nigeria. There is this belief in the North that they are ‘born to rule’. This has made the control of the leadership of Nigeria to be of utmost importance to the North and the elites see high rate of poverty and illiteracy as a political tool to achieve their aims and objectives. In other words, the moment the elites satisfy their selfish interests, the poor masses

⁷⁶ National Bureau of Statistics, ‘2019 Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria: Executive Summary’, National Bureau of Statistics, 2019, 1-25, at 6, available at <2019%20POVERY%20AND% 20INEQUALITY %20IN% 20 NIGERIA.pdf>, accessed on 22/12/20.

⁷⁷ *ibid*, at 7 & 9.

⁷⁸ OXFAM, ‘Inequality in Nigeria: Exploring the Drivers’, OXFAM International, 2017, 1-55, at 15, available at <https://www-cdn.oxfam.org/s3fs-public/file_attachments/cr-inequality-in-nigeria-170517-en.pdf>, accessed on 22nd December 2020.

⁷⁹ National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Key Indicators: Unemployment Q2 2020’, available at <<https://nigerianstat.gov.ng/>>, accessed on 22nd December 2020.

⁸⁰ National Bureau of Statistics, ‘Crime Data – Drug Abuse and Enforcement 2012-2016’, National Bureau of Statistics, 2012-2016, Downloads/Crime_Data_-_Drug_Abuse_and_Enforcement_2012_-_2016_.pdf, accessed on 22nd December 2020.

⁸¹ OXFAM, *supra*, at 26.

⁸² *ibid*

are left to their own peril. The poor masses are only relevant for political purposes while their basic needs are relegated to the background. Arguably, any effort towards addressing the issue of terrorism in the North must begin with providing the social and economic needs of the poor masses so that they will not feel left out. Having examined the challenges to the fight against terrorism in Nigeria, the next section explores the impact of terrorism on the Nigerian economy.

1.3. The Impact of Terrorism on the Nigerian Economy

The impact of terrorism on the Nigerian economy cannot be overemphasized. As stated in section 4.2.3 above, billions of dollars is being channeled to the fight against terrorism. The implication of this is that money that would have been used to address poverty, provide effective healthcare sector and cater for other basic needs of Nigerians is being spent on security. Also, terrorism has given State governors the excuse to map out billions of naira as ‘security vote’. This ‘security vote’ costs about ₦241.2 billion annually and has been an avenue for more corruption amongst State governors.⁸³ It is worth knowing that ‘security vote’ is spent at the governor’s discretion and is not subject to legislative oversight or independent audit. Recently, a Federal High Court (FHC) sitting in Lagos State struck out a matter seeking to make the thirty-six State governors in Nigeria to account for the ‘security vote’ of their respective States.⁸⁴ Thus, money that should go to the real sector of the economy is siphoned through ‘security vote’.

It has also been argued that terrorism impedes the development of Nigeria. For instance, in the Northern part of Nigeria, BH targets small shops selling goods forbidden to Muslims.⁸⁵ This has led to the exodus of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from the North, thus increasing the rate of unemployment in Nigeria.⁸⁶

Another victim of the activities of terrorists in Nigeria is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The aim of every business is to maximize profit and this can only be achieved where the enabling

⁸³Transparency International, ‘Camouflaged Cash: How ‘Security Votes’ Fuel Corruption in Nigeria’, *Transparency International*, 2018, 1-17, at 13, available at <https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DSP_Nigeria_Camouflage_Cash_Web2.pdf>, accessed on 23rd December 2020.

⁸⁴ Ben Ezemalu, ‘Court Strikes out Suit Seeking Accountability of Security Votes by Governors’, *Premium Times*, June 7, 2020, available at <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/396588-court-strikes-out-suit-seeking-accountability-of-security-votes-by-governors.html>>, accessed on 23rd December 2020.

⁸⁵ David Imhonopi and Ugochukwu Moses Urim, ‘The Spectre of Terrorism and Nigeria’s Industrial Development: A Multi-Stakeholder Imperative’, *Africa Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*, [2016]Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 20-40, at 32.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

environment for businesses to thrive has been created. The activities of BH and other terrorist organization have created a very hostile environment for business in Nigeria especially due to high rate of kidnappings. For instance, FDI has continued to decline since 2015. In 2015, FDI was USD 3.06 billion – a 34.72% decline of what it was in 2014; in 2017, FDI was USD 3.05 billion – a 21.26% decline of what it was in 2016 and in 2018, FDI was USD 2.00 billion, a 42.98% decline of what it was in 2017.⁸⁷ The implication of decline in FDI is that Nigeria is not generating sufficient revenue to facilitate the development of the Country.

Following from this is the negative impact of terrorism on tourism. Tourism can only thrive where security of life and property is guaranteed, which cannot be said of Nigeria. In 2019, tourism contributed 5.1% to Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).⁸⁸ This means that tourism sector will play positive role in the development of Nigeria is properly harnessed. However, in 2018, Nigeria lost USD 1 billion in tourism revenue.⁸⁹ This development is a setback on the efforts of the Nigerian government to diversify from oil to other sectors of the economy.

It has been established that there is a strong relationship between human trafficking and terrorism.⁹⁰ It is stated that sexual violence committed by terrorist groups is connected to strategic, ideological and financial objectives.⁹¹ BH has been identified as one of the terrorist groups that use human trafficking as tactics of terrorism and for sexual exploitation.⁹² In fact,

⁸⁷Macrotrends, 'Nigeria Foreign Direct Investment 1970-2020', *Macrotrends LLC*, 2020, available at <[rd December 2020.](https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/NGA/nigeria/foreign-direct-investment#:~:text=Data%20are%20in%20current%20U.S.,a%2045.19%25%20increase%20from%202015>.)

⁸⁸ Knoema, 'Nigeria – Contribution of Travel and Tourism to GDP as a Share of GDP', *Knoema*, 2019, available at <<https://knoema.com/atlas/Nigeria/topics/Tourism/Travel-and-Tourism-Total-Contribution-to-GDP/Contribution-of-travel-and-tourism-to-GDP-percent-of-GDP>>, accessed on 23rd December 2020.

⁸⁹CEIC, 'Nigeria Tourism Revenue', CEIC, 2020, available at <<https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/nigeria/tourism-revenue#:~:text=Nigeria's%20Tourism%20Revenue%20reached%20,USD%20mn%20in%20Dec%201995>>, accessed on 23rd December 2020.

⁹⁰ United Nations, 'Identifying and Exploring the Nexus between Human Trafficking, Terrorism and Terrorism Financing', *CTED*, 2019, 1-59, at 4, available at <<https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HT-terrorism-nexus-CTED-report.pdf>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

⁹¹ Charpenel Y., 'Terrorism and Sexual Exploitation', *Fondation Scelles, Economica*, 2016, 1-13, at 1, available at <https://www.fondationscelles.org/pdf/RM4/Terrorism_and_Sexual_Exploitation_eng.pdf>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

⁹² Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Eefje de Volder and Christophe Paulussen, 'Prosecuting the Nexus between Terrorism, Conflict-related Sexual Violence and Trafficking in Human Beings before National Legal Mechanisms: Case Studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab', *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, [2020] Vol.18, Iss.2, 499-516.

terrorists see trafficking of women not only as a means for sexual exploitation but also a way of generating fund.⁹³ From 2014 to 2015, terrorists attacked Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, abducted and subsequently sold over two hundred girls.⁹⁴ The active presence of BH in the Northern part of Nigeria and the boldness with which they operate in the region show that girls and women are not safe in the region. Linked to this is the issue of child slavery. For instance, the UN reported that between 2013 and 2019, the Nigerian Army detained 3,600 children involved in non-state armed groups.⁹⁵ Arguably, this demonstrates the vulnerability of children in the Northern part of Nigeria and the extent to which BH engages in human rights abuses in the region.

Terrorism has been identified as a major driver of forced migration.⁹⁶ According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the population of internally displaced persons in Nigeria as at November 30, 2020 was 2,896,548, while Nigeria has 301,026 refugees in Niger, Cameroun and Chad.⁹⁷ A lot of funds will be required to maintain and provide for the basic needs of IDPs and refugees. For instance, the UNHCR budget for IDPs for 2020 and 2021 is USD 91 million and USD 96 million respectively.⁹⁸ Also, IDPs are faced with problems like lack of access to education and health care services, rape, *et cetera*.⁹⁹ It is also said that the

⁹³ Nadine Liv, 'An Examination of the Potential Connection between the Trafficking of Women on the Darknet and the Financing of Terrorism', *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, 2019, 19-24, at 19, available at <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep25884.8.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6c6c6f463ec482ecb8cbac658bbfc174>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

⁹⁴ Apenda Isaac Tersoo and Tough Benjamin Terzungwe, 'Terrorism and Boko Haram: A Reconsideration of Impact on World Peace', *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, [2015] Vol. 37, 97-103, at 101, available at <<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/234670778.pdf>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

⁹⁵ John Holmes, 'Military Detention of Children for suspected Boko Haram Involvement in Northeast Nigeria', *Human Right Watch*, 2019, available at <[⁹⁶ Alex P. Schmid and Judith Tennes, 'Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration', The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, *The Hague* 7, No.4, 2016, 1-63, at 3, available at <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Links-between-Terrorism-and-Migration-An-Exploration-ICCT-2016.pdf>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.](https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/09/10/they-didnt-know-if-was-alive-or-dead/military-detention-children-suspected-boko#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20(UN)%20reported,they%20detained%20over%201%2C900%20children.>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.</p></div><div data-bbox=)

⁹⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 'Nigeria Situation', *the United Nations Refugee Agency*, 2020, available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/nigeriasituation#_ga=2.155809531.1973709748.1571844796-1590759838.1571844796>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

⁹⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 'Nigeria', *United Nations Refugee Agency*, 2020, available at <<https://reporting.unhcr.org/nigeri>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

⁹⁹ National Commission for Refugees, 'National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria', *National Commission for Refugees*, [2012] 1-65, at 12, available at <<https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a7ae2324.pdf>>, accessed on 25/12/2020.

“infusion of aid workers, food, shelter and other humanitarian supplies makes host counties more prone to terrorist attacks”.¹⁰⁰ As it has been argued in this Chapter, the fact that BH and other terrorist groups seem to have ‘upper hand’ over the Nigeria military in the Northern part of the country means that the problems facing IDPs and refugees will continue to get worst.

Another issue worth noting is the rate of human rights abuses by the Nigeria military in the fight against terrorism. Amnesty International is of the view that in response to attacks by BH, the Nigerian military detain suspects without any charge and engage in arbitrary executions.¹⁰¹ It is worth knowing that due to incessant attacks by BH, kidnappings and insecurity of life and the poor approach of the Nigerian government to these issues, the Financial Times reported that Nigeria is at risk of becoming a failed State.¹⁰² All these goes to demonstrate the extent to which terrorism has impacted on the Nigerian economy. The next section concludes the Chapter and argues that based on the analysis in this Chapter, the prospect of success in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria is gloom.

1.4. Conclusion.

This article examined the challenges to the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. It also explored the impact of terrorism on the Nigerian economy. It argued that the fight against terrorism in Nigeria has not been successful due to ineffective intelligence gathering, ineffective regional and international cooperation, corruption, ethnicity and social disenfranchisement. The article also found that terrorism has impacted negatively on the Nigerian economy. It has led to dwindling FDI, exodus of SMEs from the Northern part of Nigeria, loss of revenue from tourism, human trafficking and sexual exploitation of women and increase in the number of IDPs and refugees. To this extent, the article concludes that there is no prospect of the fight against terrorism in Nigeria being a success. All the issues explored in this article need to be addressed in order to

¹⁰⁰ Seung-Whan Choi and Idean Salehyan, ‘No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism’, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, [2013] Vol.30, No.1, 53-75, at 55, available at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26275275?read-now=1&refreqid=excelsior%3A313b1d0b3_e0f1c5e222b_783938da46fe&seq=3#page_scan_tab_contents>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

¹⁰¹ Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria 2019’, supra.

¹⁰² Financial Times, ‘Nigeria is at Risk of becoming a Failed State’, Financial Times, December 22, 2020, available at <<https://www.ft.com/content/9abc218d-3881-4bfd-8951-e76336cde94f>>, accessed on 25th December 2020.

achieve success in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria but it appears the political will needed to address them is lacking.