he Myths and the “Meat” of Separation of Powers in Nigeria: Episodic Constitutionalism and Democratic Survival

Abstract

Separation of powers is widely regarded as a foundational principle of constitutional democracy, designed to prevent the concentration of power and to secure political liberty. However, this doctrine is often dismissed in Nigeria, both in popular discourse and scholarly literature as mostly mythical. This is because it is mostly entrenched in constitutional texts but routinely undermined in practice by executive dominance, legislative subservience, judicial vulnerability, and pervasive elite capture. That absolutist pessimism is challenged in this paper by advancing a more nuanced account of separation of powers as an “episodic constitutional safeguard” in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This paper draws from doctrinal analysis, judicial decisions, and legislative practice and argues that although separation of powers in Nigeria does not operate as a stable or continuous institutional equilibrium, it has nonetheless produced notable and consequential democratic outcomes at critical moments of political crisis. It is these moments that this paper conceives as the “meat” of separation of powers and they shows that Nigerian constitutional institutions are not merely symbolic, but possess latent capacities to restrain power when constitutional survival is at stake. The analysis focuses on four landmark episodes: the judicial nullification of an illegally sustained governorship and restoration of electoral mandate (Ngige v. Obi); the Supreme Court’s rejection of party supremacy in Amaechi v. INEC; the Nigerian Senate’s refusal to confirm a presidential nominee as Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission; and the legislative defeat of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s Third Term agenda. These cases demonstrate that separation of powers in Nigeria, while fragile and inconsistent, is neither mythical nor inconsequential. Rather, it operates selectively, becoming most effective during moments of heightened constitutional threat, elite fragmentation, and public scrutiny. The article concludes that Nigeria’s democratic challenge lies not in the absence of separation of powers, but in its failure to be institutionalized beyond moments of crisis.