INCONGRUITY IN DEFINITIONS OF A CHILD: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN NIGERIA

Abstract

The recognition of children as holders of rights is now a settled principle, premised on the understanding that the inherent vulnerability of childhood demands sustained protection. As Jeremy Bentham observed, ‘everything must be done for an imperfect being, which as yet does nothing for itself.’ However, the possession of rights is inseparable from the notion of responsibility, including responsibility for conduct that infringes upon the rights of others. This article interrogates the legal conception of the child within the criminal justice system and examines how this conception influences the attribution of criminal responsibility. Employing a doctrinal research methodology, the study critically analyses relevant primary and secondary legal sources. The research is of practical significance to a wide range of stakeholders, particularly policymakers, judicial officers, and child-rights advocates involved in decisions affecting children. It recommends, inter alia, that the Child’s Rights Act (CRA) should expressly prescribe a minimum age of criminal responsibility to eliminate ambiguity surrounding the applicable age threshold for offences under the Act. Such reform would also harmonise the conflicting age provisions currently contained in the Criminal Code, the Penal Code, and the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA).