Russian Geo-Strategic and Economic Interests and Wagner Group's Deployment in Libyan and Syrian Conflicts

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Abstract

This paper examines Russia's strategic deployment of the Wagner Group, officially called PMC Wagner, a Private Military Company (PMC) in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts as an instrument of hybrid warfare designed to advance Russia's geo-strategic and economic objectives in the Middle East region between 2011 and 2023. The paper analyzes Russia's leveraging of the Wagner Group operations to secure critical strategic assets, including military bases, energy resources, and regional influence, without direct state involvement that could trigger international escalation of suspicions and opposition. The paper relies on qualitative method of data collection and a descriptive method of data analysis was also employed. It reveals that Wagner's deployment in Syria complemented official Russian military intervention by protecting energy infrastructure, supporting the Assad regime, and securing Russia's Mediterranean access through Tartus naval and Khmeimim airbases. Also, the interest of Russian energy companies in the acquisition of exploration contracts and reconstruction opportunities worth billions of dollars is uppermost for Russia. Libya's strategic importance lies in its vast oil reserves and geographic position controlling Mediterranean migration routes. Through Wagner's support for General Haftar's forces, Russia sought to establish a North African foothold while positioning itself for potential energy partnerships and military base agreements. The paper therefore, concludes that the Wagner Group model represents a sophisticated approach to power projection that circumvents traditional international law constraints while advancing state interests. This hybrid warfare strategy enables Russia to pursue aggressive foreign policy goals, secure economic opportunities, and test Western responses without direct military confrontation. Drawing from the expository findings, the paper recommends that the international community must build a global consensus in managing the Libya and Syria conflicts while strengthening the existing international legal framework guiding the activities of Private Military Companies globally.

Keywords: Russia, Wagner Group, Libyan conflicts, Syrian conflicts, Economic Interest

1. Introduction

The emergence of the Wagner Group as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy represents a significant evolution in Russia's approach to projecting power and influence in global conflicts. This Private Military Company (PMC), while officially denied by the Russian government, has become a central component of Russia's strategy to advance its geo-strategic and economic interests in conflict zones across the Middle East and North Africa. The deployment of Wagner forces in Syria and Libya exemplifies Russia's sophisticated use of hybrid warfare tactics to achieve strategic objectives while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding the political costs associated with conventional military intervention (Gressel, 2021). Furthermore, Russia's renewed engagement in Middle Eastern and North African affairs marks a departure from the post-Soviet period of regional withdrawal. Following the collapse of the USSR, Russia largely retreated from its traditional spheres of influence, allowing Western powers to dominate regional security arrangements. However, under Vladimir Putin's leadership, Russia has systematically worked to restore its status as a global power capable of projecting influence beyond its immediate neighborhood (Kofman& Matthew, 2019).

The Wagner Group, established around 2014 and closely associated with businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, emerged as a key leadership figure of the group. As Marten (2019) notes in "Russia's Use of Semi-State Security Forces," the Wagner Group allows Moscow to pursue aggressive foreign policy objectives while maintaining the fiction of non-involvement, thereby avoiding the domestic and international costs of official military engagement. The deployment of Wagner forces represents what Mark (2021) describes in "Moscow Rules" as Russia's embrace of "non-linear warfare", a comprehensive approach that combines conventional and unconventional tactics, official and unofficial actors, to achieve strategic objectives across multiple domains simultaneously. This approach allows Russia to compete effectively with Western powers despite significant resource constraints.

The chronicle of both conflicts is traceable to the waves of violent unrest, confrontation and uprising widely referred to the Arab Spring or Revolution that swept across the North African States of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya down to the middle east cities of Yemen, Bahrain and Syria (Ojo,2012). One undisputable fact about the Libya and Syrian conflict is the proliferation of myriad of armed groups divided across different ideological, religious national, regional, ethnic tribal lines but Wagner Group is purely an external military mercenary contractor working for economic and strategic interests of its paymaster (Russia in this instance). Secondly the special attention on Wagner Group stems from the fact that it is one of the forces fighting in these two countries at the same time under the same command (the Wagner command structure).

Therefore, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts provided Russia with unprecedented opportunities to reassert its influence in regions traditionally dominated by Western powers, while simultaneously pursuing concrete economic gains through resource extraction and infrastructure development. Through the Wagner Group, Russia has been able to support favourable regimes, secure strategic military positions, and gain access to valuable natural resources, all while avoiding the international legal and political constraints that would accompany official military deployment (Rumer & Richard, 2019). This is inconsequential as much as it serves Russian interest. The question that looms large is what is the nature of Russia's interests that influenced the deployment of Wagner Group in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts? This paper sets out to evaluate the nature of Russian interest in the deployment of Wagner Group in both conflicts between 2011 and 2023.

2. Wagner's Libyan Deployment

Russia's involvement in Libya, primarily through Wagner Group deployment, represents a more complex and ambitious attempt to reshape regional power dynamics. Beginning around 2019, Wagner forces deployed to support General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) against the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli.

The Libyan deployment reflected Russia's broader strategy of challenging Western influence in North Africa while positioning itself as a power broker in regional conflicts. As Jalel, (2021) observes in "Russia in Libya: A Decade of Strategy," Russia's Libyan intervention aims to establish permanent military presence in North Africa, potentially including naval facilities that would project Russian power across the Mediterranean. While Wagner forces have provided significant military capabilities to Haftar's forces, they have been unable to achieve decisive victory against the GNA and its Turkish-supported forces (Jalel, 2021). The nature of these interests as identified, form the crux of the proceeding discussions.

a. Geo-political Influence: As reported by Anna (2019), Russia's national strategic policy towards Libya is a key factor and guiding principle in understanding its role in geo-political influence towards Libya. At the same time, Libya is one of Russia's most important partners in North Africa, so, Russia is actively interested in what's going on in Libya. For example, Russia participated in international initiatives devoted to the future of Libya, including the one convened by Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte in November 2018 in Palermo, a two-day conference in which the Russian delegation was headed by Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev (Anna, 2019). That particular role was not without a strong statement on Russia's strategic position in the area.

The participation is an indication that Russia was actively involved in the political processes and the future of Libya, specifically in the presidential and parliamentary conducted elections in 2019, as well as the United Nations Action Plan for Libya, which assumes political reforms (including the creation of a new constitution) and economic reforms. Therefore, the study argued that the aim of the Russian actions in Libya was to create a situation in which it was impossible to make decisions regarding the future of Libya without its open and direct participation and by implication, protecting its interest without much noise and international attention.

By supporting Haftar, Russia aimed to establish itself as a key power broker in the region, challenging the influence of Western nations, particularly the United States and European Union members (Megerisi & Toaldo, 2016). This geopolitical manoeuvring allows Russia to project power beyond its immediate neighbourhood and position itself as a global player capable of shaping outcomes in strategically important regions. The Wagner Group's presence in Libya serves as a low-cost, high-reward tool for advancing these geopolitical ambitions.

Also, Wagner Group's support for Haftar's forces included efforts to secure key coastal cities and military installations. This could pave the way for Russia to establish a more permanent military presence in Libya. Such a foothold would allow Russia to monitor NATO activities in the Mediterranean and potentially disrupt migration flows to Europe, giving it additional leverage in its relations with European nations (Borshchevskaya, 2020).

According to a revelation presented by Fasanotti, Wagner's support for Haftar served fundamental strategic purposes for Russia thus:

> It provides a justification for Russian involvement that is more palatable to the international community; it also aligns with Russia's domestic counterterrorism agenda, particularly concerning the potential return of foreign fighters from the Middle East and North Africa. It also positions Russia as a responsible international actor capable of addressing global security challenges and influencing the future political landscape of Libya, while extract concessions from other international actors involved in the conflict, and demonstrate its ability to shape outcomes in regions traditionally dominated by Western influence (Fasanotti, 2020).

From the above, the Wagner Group's operations in Libya between 2011 and 2023, served as a means of enhancing Russia's international reputation and dominance in the Middle Eastern region.

b. Oil and Gas Resources: In a report published by the US Energy Information Administration in 2021, one important economic interest of Russia resulting in the deployment of Wager was oil and gas resources: Libya possesses Africa's largest proven oil reserves and significant natural gas deposits, making it an attractive target for energy-hungry nations, including US and Russia. In 2013, Libya was ranked 9th position in the world ranking of top 10 holders of proven crude oil reserves and an important contributor to the global supply of crude (The US Energy Information Administration Report, 2021). This is shown in the figure below:



Figure 1: The World's Top 10 Holders of Proven Oil Reserves (2013-2019)
Source: Oil and Gas Monitor (2013, p. 6)

In a report by Center for Strategic and International Studies (2012), after the fall of Gaddafi's regime, Russian companies lost their advantages in Libya's energy sector due to competition with Western oil corporations working in the extraction industry. However, in 2013, Russia's oil corporation, Gazprom Neft managed to renew its major oil and gas project. Under the new contract originally signed by Gazprom Neft as early as February 2011, Russia purchased a 33% share ($163 million) of the Italian oil company ENI (Chichkin, 2013). Gazprom Neft was one of the first Russian businesses that returned to Libya after the Civil War. In 2013, another Russian oil company, Tatneft, renewed its operations in Libya that were abandoned during Libya's uprising. Tatneft, Russia's sixth largest oil company entered Libya in 2006 and had invested about $260 million in its operations. Despite tough competition with American, British, and French companies, Russia began to restore its major contracts in Libya's oil and gas industries in the post-Arab spring period. In May 2016, Libya's current Oil Minister, MashallahZwai, announced that national oil companies would expand their linkages with Russian businesses (Fornaji, 2013). That was a major encouraging Russian oil breakthrough in Libya.

According to the reports presented by the American Petroleum Institute, the major reason Libyan crude is better than others is because majority of Libyan oil fields supply sweet, light oil that is waxy and thick. Its crude has very low sulphur content under 0.6% as opposed to sour crude, which is above 0.6% and is rich in sulphur. Technical information in crude oil production shows that the smaller the amount of sulphur, the easier and cheaper it is to refine the oil. (American Petroleum Institute, 2014). The strategy of Russia was to fend off the key US and other Western oil companies that dominated the Libyan oil and gas sector such as ConocoPhillips, Marathon Oil and Hess (collectively making up the Oasis Group Consortium), Exxon Mobile and Occidental etc.

As affirmed by Mufson (2011), powerful U.S. oil Corporations had been influencing the government in Tripoli to place their interests as a top priority. With the overthrow of Gaddafi, the intense struggle that existed between him and the US oil companies over how much profit they get is gone. It was recorded that in 2008, Italy's ENI, Petro-Canada and Occidental lost $5.4 billion from renegotiated production contracts with Gaddafi and this is to the advantage of the Russian oil companies.

By supporting the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar through the Wagner Group, Russia aimed to secure preferential treatment for its energy companies in future oil and gas contracts (Ramani, 2020). By gaining a foothold in Libya's energy sector, Russia could enhance its global energy market position and diversify its economic interests beyond its traditional spheres of influence. Most importantly, Wagner was deployed to protect oil facilities in the region they occupied. The map below shows Libyan oil infrastructures in Libya.



Figure 2: Libya Oil Infrastructure. Source: Libyan Oil Almanac (2015, p. 33) Libyan Oil Almanac (2015) major oil infrastructure and refining capacity, about 80% of Libya's oil refineries are located in the Sirte basin, which also accounts for a vast majority of the country's oil output.

c. Arms Deal: Another fundamental geo-strategic interest of Russia in Libya consequent upon the deployment of Wagner was to sustain its arms market in Libya. In a report by International Institute for Strategic Studies (2013), Libya has traditionally been one of Russia's most important customers in the Middle East region. For example, in 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote off Libya's $4.5 billion debt in exchange for new arms contracts and deals for the Russian oil company Gazprom Neft (Yulia, 2017). The contracts involved upgrading 200 units of T-72 tanks and supplying Russia's YAK-130 training aircrafts in 2013. According to Mikhail B, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister and Putin's Special Representatives for the Middle East, 'these are our traditional ties, we prepared many Libyan specialists, including civil and military professionals; and we hope that this potential will also be beneficial to the Russian-Libyan cooperation" (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013).

In the same above-referred report, as of 2010, the Libyan Army was equipped with 500 units of Russia's T-55 tanks, 100 units of T-62, 200 units of T-72, and 180 units of T-90. Also, Libya's ammunition in the Register included 1040 units of Russia's tanks T-55, 70 units of T-62, and 115 units of T-72. In addition, the Libyan army had 1000 units of BMP1 infantry fighting vehicles, 750 units of BTR-50, and BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers. Wagner was instrumental in coordinating these arms deals. In the same line of thought, Indrani (2015) explains that after the fall of the Gaddafi's regime and the introduction of the embargo on arms supplies to Libya by the UN Security Council, Russia lost about $4 billion in military contracts. Furthermore, if it had not been for NATO's military invention in Libya, Libya would have signed another $2 billion contract to buy Russia's arms and military equipment (Megerisi & Toaldo, 2016).

The main explanation for the renewal of cooperation in this sphere is the fact that Libya's army remains equipped mainly with the Russian arms systems, which also suggested the necessity to train Libya's military personnel in Russia. Such military-technical cooperation was indispensable since the US and the West are fully in support of the government in Tripoli; Russian presence (under Wagner) became necessary to maintain its military presence in Libya. The point here is that despite the fact that Russia deployed Wagner to fight for Hafter in opposition to the Western-backed government in Tripoli, the dominance of Russia's military technology in Libya's arms market during the Gaddafi era and post Gaddafi era was sustained.

d. Infrastructural Contracts: According tothe report presented by Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs (2015), Wagner Group's presence in Libya served as a means to secure enormous economic opportunities for Russia. By providing military support to Haftar's LNA, Russia positioned itself as a key player in Libya's future, potentially giving Russian companies an advantage in securing reconstruction contracts. The country's infrastructure hadbeen severely damaged by years of conflict, and rebuilding efforts would require significant investment. Russian firms, particularly those in the construction and engineering sectors stoodto benefit from potential contracts in areas such as road construction, power generation, and water management (Katz, 2020).

For example, in 2008, Russian Railways began the construction of the 544-kilometre railway from Sirte to Benghazi. The total cost of the contract was estimated to exceed $4.5 billion (Ash, 2013). In February 2011, Russian Railways had to suspend their operations and evacuate all employees due to the civil war. The fate of the contract remained uncertain until February 2013, when Libya's government announced that the project would be renewed. That decision could be explained by the fact that, by the time of the armed conflict, the company, Russian Railways, had already built 100 kilometres of embankments with 30 infrastructure objects and laid 30 kilometres of track with 115 switches (Ash, 2013). That was also a key economic interest for Russia. The above analysis shows the enormous economic advantages in favour of Russia consequent upon the deployment of Wagner in Libya.

The proceeding analysis showcases the beneficiary in the deployment of the Wagner Group in Syria.

2. Wagner's Syrian Deployment

a. The Protection of Assad's Regime: According to the report by the Middle East Institute (2015), the protection of the Assad regime in Syria was fundamental for Russia. The report went on to assert that the US and her Western allies had publicly antagonized Assad for turning an episode of domestic protest into a horrific Civil War and so, they wanted

him out by all means. They did not believe that any peace process could succeed in Syria with Assad in power. To allow Assad to reassert control over all of Syria was viewed by the US as immoral and a recipe for future instability. Thus they wanted him out by all necessary means including force. However, Russia had unanimously stood against regime change to avoid the 'Libyan model' to be replicated in Syria.

It could be recalled that at the build-up of Libyan intervention in March 17th 2011, Russia and China abstained from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (UNSCR 1973) which authorized military intervention into Libyan territory (Odeyemi, 2015). Though, some scholars argued that the abstention was a nod for the intervention. But Russia had explained that the abstention was specifically for humanitarian purpose and not regime change. Also, India, South Africa and Brazil, abstained from the UNSCR 1973; South Africa, alongside other Western states supported both Resolutions on humanitarian grounds. However, their reactions on the outcome of the UNSCR 1973 proved that they were dissatisfied with the outcome hence, Russia stood its ground in Syria.

In the post-Libya intervention resolutions within the UNSC politics, it is indicative to note that Russian's perception, opinion, body language, voting pattern and decision were significantly in favour of Syria. The voting pattern in the Security Council in Syria is shown in the table below:

Table 1: Russia and China protest votes in the UNSCRs in Syria (2011-2017)

	Date of Votes	Remarks on Votes (Russia and China)
1.	Oct. 11th 2011	Russia and China vetoed a sanctioned resolution drafted by Europe concerning Syria
2	Feb 4th 2012	Russia and China vetoed a UNSCR backing an Arab- Western peace plan that called for Assad to step dawn ,while other 13 members of the UNSC voted in favour of the resolution
3	Feb16th 2012	Russia and China vetoed a draft of UNGAR condemning Syria that was adopted by 137-12 margin with 17 abstentions
4	1st March 2012	Russia and China vetoed against a draft resolution of the UN Human Right Council condemning crimes in Syria
5	July 19th 2012	Russia and China vetoed sponsored UNSCR that would have punished Syria with economic sanction for failing to carry out a peace plan agreed upon by march. Eleven Security Council members including America, Britain and France voted in favour of the resolution. Pakistan and South Africa abstained
6	April 4th 2012	China and Russia endorsed the Resolution establishing the Koffi Anna's six point peace plan but was inapplicable due to western support
7	April 4th 2012	China and Russia also endorsed the Resolution establishing the UNSMIS was also inapplicable
8	Sept 27th, 2013	China and Russia also endorsed the Geneva communiqué that deal with the chemical weapon issue.

9	Sept, 22 2014	Russia and China vetoed resolution seeking referral to the International Criminal Court should be based on the premise of respect for the judicial sovereignty of States and the principle of complementarity.
10	8 October 2016	Russia vetoed The French-proposed document indiscriminately laid the blame for the escalation of tensions in the Syrian Arab Republic solely on the country's authorities and plainly attempted, through a ban on military flights over the city of Aleppo, to afford protection to Jabhat al-Nusra terrorists and the militants that have merged with it, despite the UN member states' obligation to fight the terrorist threat with all available means.
11	12 April 2017	Russia vetoed France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America sponsored resolution which seek to designated the guilty of Assad government prior to an independent and objective investigation

Source: UN Biographical and Information System,2018.

Flowing from the above, key statements from Russia Foreign policy actor points towards saving the Assad regime. For example, The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrove, cited in Ferdinand (2013), noted with regrets, the armed action taken against Libya. According to his official statement "…Russia will paralyse any resolution aimed at overthrowing legitimate authorities in sovereign states under the pretext of protecting the civilian population". The strong 'wordedness' of the statement emphasises Russia's strong feelings about the situation.

On the 21th of March 2012, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described the Resolution 1973 as 'defective and flawed' stating that it 'resembles medieval calls for arm crusades'. These reactions significantly informed Russia's decisions to protect Syria Assad as its ally in the region using the Wager group as foot soldiers.

b. Tartus Military Operation Base: Another strategic interest of Russia in Syria is the Tartus military bases at the Khmeimim. The military bases provide the necessary infrastructure to stay in West Asia, expanding its military access and robust markets for its arms exports. Operating in that base makes Russia feel as an equal partner by the West, including the US, in the international community. Russia wants to showcase its global power and its capacity as an important player in resolving challenges, such as international terrorism that is affecting the region and the world. Russia's Wagner deployment did make the West interact with it and also cooperate towards a peaceful resolution for Syria. Russia intervention through Wagner was also to save Syria from falling in the hands of the Islamic State (IS). Russia fears that the potential fall of the Assad regime may serve as a springboard for insurrection in the Caucasus and Central Asia for regime change and democracy which is against its traditional ideology (Abdul, 2015).

c. Investment in Oil and Gas: According to International Crisis Group publication in 2013, Russian companies had made investments worth roughly $20 billion in Syria and such need to be protected at all cost. In July 2015, Russia announced that it would seek to invest another $1.6 billion in the energy sector through contracts (Indrani, 2015). In 2013, Syria signed a twenty-five-year contract (2013-2038) with the Russian Soyuzneftegaz company for oil and gas drilling and exploration in an area off the Syrian coast, from Tartus to the city of Banyas, which covers 2,190 square kilometres. The agreement also extends to about 45 miles into the Mediterranean (Indrani, 2015). In all ramifications, that was not a mean agreement in the face of the realities on ground.

In its 2010 report, the US Geological Survey estimated 1.7bn barrels of undiscovered oil and 122tn cubic feet of natural gas in the Levant Basin along the eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the Assad regime sought to rehabilitate and operate oil fields and power plants in areas controlled currently by the rebels and the Islamic State group. That was a potential opportunity for Russia to explore (International Crisis Group, 2013).

As noted by Indrani (2015), during a meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister, WalidMuallem and Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Rogozin in November 2015, Mr. Muallem said that:

> …we have data that oil and gas deposits on a shelf off the coast of Syria have enormous potential. And we hope to see not only Russian warships in Syria, but also platforms for extracting oil. He said that the Syrian authorities are hoping that Russian companies will develop the country's offshore oil deposits. He added during the meeting that one Russian firm has already signed a contract and Syria is waiting for other companies to follow suit. Syria is ready to offer Russian companies "all possible incentives." The lucrative opportunities offered to Russia will be hard to resist given its ambition of remaining an important player in the world (p.12).

From the above, Russia through Wagner's help to stem out the Islamic State (IS) from Palmyra, had a lot to do with its oil interest. Palmyra is positioned near the largest natural gas fields, JabalShaer. The IS' capture of Palmyra in May, 2015 with the seizure of nearby gas fields deprived the regime of 45 percent of its gas and electricity resources. Palmyra also had many gas fields, such as Arak, Dubayat, Hail, Hayan, Jihar, al-Mahr, Najib, Sukhneh, and AbiRabah, which, according to reports, had collectively been producing half of Syria's output of natural raw and liquid petroleum gas (Anton & Leonid, 2017).

It needs to be added that Palmyra was also the transit point for pipelines carrying gas from important fields in Hasakah and DeirEzzor provinces in north-eastern and eastern Syria, respectively. Palmyra was the hub between the extraction or transfer of virtually all of Syria's gas production and the processing and power plants. This city is also connected to the Tartus port and Iraq (Weiss & Hassan 2018).

What the above indicates is that the energy sector is one area where Russia does not want to lose out in Syria. Russia understood the importance of Syria's location as the site for a network of oil and gas pipelines in Europe.

Therefore, by helping the Assad regime to stay in power and permanently placing its forces at Syrian oil and gas region, Russia also to position itself as the nexus point of other new offshore gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Israel, Cyprus, and Greece (Weiss & Hassan 2018). Thus, the eventual overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria through Us-supported protests and strikes was a very big blow to Russian interest especially in the oil sector.

3. Conclusion

The paper was able to evaluate the dimensions of Russia's involvement in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts. It argued that Wagner Group deployment in the crises represented a sophisticated approach to projecting power and securing strategic and economic interests while maintaining plausible deniability. Emphatically, Wagner served as a key instrument of Russian foreign policy, allowing Russia to advance its geo-strategic and economic objectives in critical regions without direct state involvement. Invariably, both conflicts offered significant economic opportunities for Russian interests.

In Syria, Russia's primary geo-strategic interests centred on protecting the Assad’s regime as key and traditional ally in the Middle East. It also helped Russian in preserving its Mediterranean access through the Tartus naval base and Khmeimim airbase, maintaining influence in the Middle East. The Wagner Group's deployment complemented official Russian military operations by providing specialized services including base security, training Syrian forces, and conducting operations in resource-rich areas. Economically, Russian firms secured lucrative reconstruction contracts and energy exploration rights. Wagner operatives protected oil and gas facilities while Russian companies positioned themselves to benefit from Syria's eventual reconstruction. The group's presence in Eastern Syria, particularly around Deirez-Zor, demonstrated Russia interest in controlling energy resources and challenging U.S. influence in the region.

Furthermore, Libya’s strategic importance to Russia lies in its vast oil reserves, geographic position controlling Mediterranean migration routes, and potential as a gateway to African influence. By supporting General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) against the Western backed Government of National Accord (GNA), Russia sought to establish a foothold in North Africa while challenging Western influence. Wagner's deployment in Libya included providing military training, advanced weaponry, and direct combat support to LNA forces. This engagement served multiple purposes: securing potential energy contracts, establishing military bases that could project power across the Mediterranean, and positioning Russia as a major player in Libya's future political settlement.

Moreso, Syrian companies like Stroytransgaz secured energy exploration contracts, while reconstruction projects promised billions in potential revenue. Libya's oil wealth, estimated at Africa's largest reserves, represents enormous economic potential for Russian energy companies seeking new markets amid Western sanctions.Wagner's role often involved protecting these economic interests directly, with operatives securing oil facilities and ensuring favorable conditions for Russian business operations. The group's activities generated revenue streams while advancing state objectives, creating a self-sustaining model of influence projection.

Finally, the Wagner Group's deployment demonstrated Russia's hybrid warfare capabilities, allowing Moscow to pursue aggressive foreign policy goals while maintaining strategic ambiguity. This approach enabled Russia to test Western responses, support proxy forces, and secure economic advantages without triggering direct confrontation.

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